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ndrea Sangiovanni’s Humanity without Dignity covers a lot 
of territory and it is deep as well as broad in its 
endeavour.1 Its argument is ultimately targeted at the idea 
of human rights, but much of it deals with issues general 
to moral and political philosophy and has a significance 
that extends well beyond human rights. In this brief discussion, I 
shall, even so, comment only on his more immediate thinking on 
human rights. Sangiovanni aims to vindicate rather than subvert 
human rights, but he does so in a way that dismantles much 
accepted thinking on human rights. I briefly summarise his 
thinking before commenting on some issues it raises. 
What are human rights? A traditional answer, which 
Sangiovanni labels the ‘Orthodox’ view’, is: ‘individual moral rights 
that we possess merely in virtue of our humanity’ (177). The 
answer of the more recent ‘Political’ view, as formulated by 
Sangiovanni, is: ‘individual moral rights (or morally urgent 
interests) whose violation (primarily) by states makes sovereignty-
overriding interference or other forms of international action … 
permissible if not required’ (177). He finds both answers 
 
1 References within brackets in the text are to A. Sangiovanni, Humanity without 
Dignity. Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights (Cambridge, MS: Harvard 
University Press, 2017). 
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unsatisfactory. Neither captures the diversity of thought and 
practice now associated with human rights. His own answer, which 
he describes as the ‘Broad View’, is: “those moral rights whose 
systematic violation ought to be of universal moral, legal, and 
political concern” (191, emphasis in the original). Thus, we discover 
whether a moral right is a human right by establishing whether its 
violation ‘ought to garner universal moral, legal, and political 
concern’ (191). 
Sangiovanni uses the concept/conception distinction to explain 
how we should move from his formal concept to a substantive 
account of human rights (194). We should not suppose, he insists, 
that that entails developing a single master-list of human rights. 
Rather different contexts make different conceptions of human 
rights appropriate. Accordingly, he describes his view as the 
‘Context Sensitive Broad View’ (CSBV). The kind of contexts he 
means are not the diverse social and cultural settings in which 
uniform human rights have to be realised. Rather he means the 
different contexts in which activists, advocates and practitioners 
deploy the idea human rights; these imply and make appropriate 
different conceptions of human rights. He also suggests that 
moving from the formal concept to contextualised conceptions 
requires ‘mediating concepts’ suited to particular contexts. 
We commonly think that conceptions stemming from a single 
concept are rivalrous as well as different. For example, if theorists, 
accept a common concept of distributive justice, but go on to 
develop different conceptions of that concept, they present 
competing accounts of the distribution justice requires. Are 
Sangiovanni’s conceptions rivalrous? The answer depends on what 
explains their difference. Insofar as they reflect mere differences 
of context, they are not. But, insofar as they differ with respect to 
the same context, they compete and their proponents must 
disagree. 
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That distinction bears on Sangiovanni’s appraisal of the 
Orthodox and Political views. As we have seen, he rejects the 
account each presents of the basic concept of human rights. He 
suggests, nevertheless, that his CSBV can subsume both views 
(191, 192-93). It does so by re-interpreting them as conceptions 
appropriate to different contexts. So understood, the Orthodox 
and Political views cease to be rivals, either with one another or 
with Sangiovanni’s CSBV. But that cannot be the whole story, 
since Sangiovanni’s critique (180-90) faults both as general theories 
rather only for their basic concepts. Thus, his subsumption of the 
Orthodox and Political views within his CSBV would seem more 
formal than substantive. While he finds a place for each as a 
candidate for the role of mediating concept or substantive 
conception appropriate to its context, he finds each to be an 
unsatisfactory candidate, at least in its extant forms. 
 
Human Rights: the Concept 
Sangiovanni, then, understands human rights to be “those 
moral rights whose systematic violation ought to be of universal 
moral, legal and political concern.” That sets the template for the 
larger view of human rights he goes on to develop. He means his 
concept to be broad enough to encompass most contemporary 
usage (191) and to keep faith with the human rights culture that 
has emerged since 1945 (179, 203-05). Yet it has some puzzling 
features which make it an unlikely object of consensus. 
First, it defines human rights by way of the response their 
violation should evoke. But that seems to make the tail wag the 
dog. Surely the violation of a human right ought to be of concern 
because what is violated is a human right; it is not its evoking that 
concern that makes it a human right. Sangiovanni’s concept makes 
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essential to the very idea of a human right something that would 
seem better understood as a consequence that follows from it. 
Secondly, it is the universality of that concern that for 
Sangiovanni distinguishes its object as a human right. Universality 
is, of course, a feature standardly ascribed to human rights but it is 
normally taken to be a feature (even if with qualification) of the 
range of those who hold human rights. Why should the relevant 
universality be a universality of concern amongst onlookers? That 
may be a roundabout way of referencing the humanity of those 
who hold the right – a violation’s being properly the concern of all 
signals a concern for another as a human being, rather than as, say, 
a citizen of a particular state. But, if that is what Sangiovanni 
intends, it seems unduly circuitous. He may intend universality, 
additionally or instead, to capture the special moral significance of 
human rights.2 
Thirdly, Sangiovanni identifies the relevant concern as ‘moral, 
legal and political’; but why ‘and’ rather than ‘or’ or ‘and/or’? 
Questioning a conjunction may seem a descent into pedantry, but 
Sangiovanni is consistent in his use of that conjunction and it 
creates a puzzle for his claim about the significance of context. It 
may be that a context to which political or legal concern is 
appropriate will always be one to which moral concern is also 
appropriate, since the violation of human right is for Sangiovanni 
always the violation of a moral right. But his emphasis on the 
significance of context seems to imply that a violation could be 
properly of moral concern and only of moral concern; one, that is, 
for which political or legal concern would be inappropriate. 
Fourthly, Sangiovanni’s concept is intentionally broad; it aims 
‘to capture the distinctiveness of human rights claims in all their 
 
2 Sangiovanni remarks (194) that “a central feature of all human rights claims [is] 
… their universal and peremptory status”. 
Peter Jones – Sangiovanni on Human Rights and Equal Moral Status 
81 
 
diversity’ (192). Yet it excludes one significant conception of 
human rights: a purely legal conception. It does so because it 
requires a human right always to be a moral right. For Sangiovanni 
that requirement does not stand in the way of his concept’s 
accommodating international legal human rights, since those 
rights, he argues, must always be justified by underlying individual 
moral rights (212). In response, many lawyers and legal scholars 
would insist that, even if morality does justify the creation of legal 
human rights, those rights exist as legal rights only. Some also insist 
that the rationale for legal human rights is to be found within 
international law itself3. 
 
Finally, there is the question of what justifies our continued use 
of the term ‘human right’. Sangiovanni is unwilling to accept that 
a human right is a right we hold ‘in virtue of our humanity’ (191, 
192), since he associates that phrase with the Orthodox view and 
particularly with claims about human dignity whose inadequacy he 
exposes in his first chapter. But the phrase ‘in virtue of our 
humanity’ need bring with it no such baggage. It need convey only 
that human rights are rights people hold in virtue of their status 
(moral or legal) as human beings, just as ‘citizen’s rights’ are rights 
people hold in virtue of their status (moral or legal) as citizens. In 
the absence of some such clear link to humanity, the phrase 
‘human rights’ becomes inaccurate and misleading (as it is for the 
Political view).4 Doubtless it remains rhetorically useful but that is 
hardly a respectable reason for conniving at its continued use. 
 
3 See e. g. P. Macklem, The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015). 
4 Sangiovanni allows that, on his view, moral rights possessed by non-humans 
would be human rights provided only that their systematic violation ought to be 
of universal moral, legal and political concern (192). We may indeed share some 
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Human Rights: Conceptions and Contexts 
The most distinctive feature of Sangiovanni’s developed 
account of human rights is the significance he ascribes to context. 
As we have seen, he rejects the assumption that there should be a 
single unified human rights practice informed by a single master 
list of human rights. Rather, we should recognise a multiplicity of 
practices reflecting the multiplicity of contexts in which human 
rights can be invoked. Those practices are united by Sangiovanni’s 
concept of human rights, but we can move beyond that formal 
concept and give substance to human rights only with respect to a 
particular context. Only then can we judge what counts as 
relevantly ‘universal’ and relevantly ‘moral’, ‘legal’, and ‘political’, 
and give substance to human rights and their correlative duties 
(192). Only then does a conception become ‘determinate’ and 
‘truth-evaluable’ (198, 206). 
The relevant context is, for Sangiovanni, one in which, or for 
which, we deploy the idea of human rights. His trio of human 
rights concerns – moral, legal, political – might lead us to suppose 
that those three describe the types of context that are significant. 
They do indeed have contextual significance for Sangiovanni, 
particularly it would seem for mediating concepts, but his view of 
contextual difference is more refined than that. In arguing for the 
relevance of context, he gives a wide array of examples of 
practitioners and activists deploying human rights in different 
contexts. These include (195-203) the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights; judges serving in the European Court of Human 
Rights; a domestic court or judge in Germany or South Africa 
addressing human rights issues; state-actors deciding whether 
 
rights with other animals but it would be odd to describe the rights of all of 
those animals as ‘human rights’. 
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human rights violations justify intervention in Syria or Libya or 
Egypt; domestic human rights movements across Latin America, 
sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia; Human Rights Watch considering 
whether it should treat homophobia in South Africa as a human 
rights issue; Amnesty International seeking to combat state-
authorized threats to liberty; Black Lives Matter invoking human 
rights in relation to illiteracy amongst black children in US inner 
cities. Rather than try to understand these different actors as 
engaged in a single human rights project, we do better, insists 
Sangiovanni, to keep faith with the multiplicity of practices they 
represent (196, 198). We should embrace ‘the great diversity in the 
kinds of universal concern relevant to different contexts’ (198). 
How far, then, should we be persuaded by Sangiovanni’s claims 
for context? Perhaps the clearest contextual contrast is between 
cases in which practitioners appeal to morally grounded but legally 
unrecognised human rights and cases in which they are tasked with 
interpreting and administering an already established body of legal 
human rights. Sangiovanni gives special attention to international 
law as a “specific context”, but the international legal human rights 
system has itself to address different contexts and it engages in 
diverse legal or quasi-legal human rights practices (178, 207-08). 
Yet we still have reason to expect some overlap of content between 
human rights legally and non-legally conceived, even though a 
legally recognised right is a different animal from a right that is only 
a moral claim. Recall, though, that Sangiovanni’s test for a human 
right is a right whose violation ought to garner universal moral, legal 
and political concern. We can intelligibly claim that concern for the 
violation of a legally established human right. But we are more 
likely to reach for Sangiovanni’s ‘ought’ test if we are considering 
not which rights are, but which ought to be, recognised as human 
rights in law (cf. 199). Those rights are likely to overlap in 
significant measure with morally grounded human rights, even 
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though the two types of right may still not be co-extensive5 (cf. 
Buchanan 2013). 
Considering which rights human beings possess morally and 
which politically warrant sovereignty-overriding interference, are 
clearly two different concerns; but whether they need spawn 
different conceptions of human rights is moot. Sangiovanni 
objects that the Political view’s concept of human rights is 
unsatisfactory, because it makes the existence of those rights 
depend upon shifting political contingencies (186-90). But, he 
claims, if we recast the Political view as a conception of human 
rights, and one conception amongst others, we avoid that 
objection (192-93). Do we? If the Political view remains a 
conception of the human rights we possess, its human rights will 
remain tied to shifting political contingencies. We can liberate it 
from the contingency objection only by making it a view on the 
international political action we should or should not take to 
uphold human rights, whose identity as human rights is 
independent of itself. 
When we turn to some of the other cases Sangiovanni cites, 
their differences of concern have no obvious significance for 
conceptions of human rights. Organisations such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and Black Lives Matter, 
certainly focus their efforts on different domains of human rights, 
and single-human rights organisations such as Article 19 and PEN 
International even more so, but it is hard to see why their different 
concerns should amount to different contexts that require 
different conceptions of human rights. All of those organisations 
could function with the same conception and, insofar as there is 
 
5 Cf. A. Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
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scope for differences of conception, they might be found amongst 
activists within the same organisation. 
Sangiovanni considers contexts to be determinative of human 
rights conceptions, at least in some measure. A particular context 
makes a particular conception of human rights ‘appropriate’. But 
how particular and exclusive is that ‘appropriateness’? It is difficult 
to know and it may not be easy for Sangiovanni to say. It is hard 
to believe that context alone can do much to tell us what human 
rights there ought to be or to pre-empt or defuse the disagreements 
human rights attract. It is more likely that those disagreements will 
still need to be addressed through substantive argument – 
argument of the sort that takes up much of Sangiovanni’s book. 
There also seems ample scope for rights to ‘run across’ 
contexts, including Sangiovanni’s three broad contexts: moral, 
political and legal. Consider the paradigm instances he gives of 
ways of treating people as moral unequals from which, he argues, 
human rights should protect us: torture; slavery; rape; segregation 
and apartheid; caste societies; persecution and invidious forms of 
discrimination; demeaning forms of paternalism; concentration 
and death camps; genocide; cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment (74). Forms of mistreatment of this sort obviously merit 
universal concern and, if human rights ever warrant international 
political or legal action as well as moral concern, they must do so 
in these cases. The legal positivist might insist that, even though 
they may be motivated by the same concern as moral human rights, 
international legal human rights belong to a quite separate context. 
But Sangiovanni rejects that sharp separation, especially in the case 
of legal human rights that protect people from socially cruel 
treatment as moral unequals. Thus, the human rights that are pre-
eminently Sangiovanni’s concern do not comport well with the 
image of three separate bodies of right – moral, political and legal 
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– each circumscribed by its own conception and each cocooned 
within its own context. 
 
Equal Moral Status 
Human rights are normally associated with moral status and 
with equal status. Human beings are said to possess both. They 
matter one-by-one and they matter equally. Their equal moral 
status underpins their human rights and their human rights 
manifest their equal moral status. Claims of ‘dignity’ or ‘worth’ are 
often used to express these ideas, especially in preambles to human 
rights declarations, and some philosophers have tried to justify 
them by way of a property or capacity all humans allegedly share 
and share equally. Having shown their lack of success, Sangiovanni 
concludes that we should abandon entirely this way of thinking 
about human rights and equal moral status and conceive their 
relationship in quite other terms. 
The equality that matters, he argues, is absence of inequality, 
and inequality matters because of the bad of being treated as less 
than an equal – being treated as, for example, a mere animal or an 
object or a ‘polluted’ being. Such inferiorizing is socially cruel; it 
attacks or obliterates people’s “capacity to develop and maintain 
an integrated sense of self” (76). I listed above some severe 
instances Sangiovanni gives of that cruelty: torture, slavery, rape, 
and the like. Here I cannot do justice to his subtle and perceptive 
account of the harm and the wrong wrought by inferiorizing 
treatment; nor do I challenge it. I focus only on the way it leads 
Sangiovanni to invert the relationship between human rights and 
equal moral status as it is usually understood. 
On Sangiovanni’s view, equal moral status does not precede 
human rights or, qua status, contribute to the case for them. Rather, 
it is a status bestowed upon us by human rights that safeguard us 
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from treatment as an inferior. In order of concern, therefore, 
inequality precedes equality and it does so in two respects. 
 
First, equal moral status is constituted by or consists in a bundle of rights against 
certain kinds of inferiorizing treatment (rather than the other way round), 
and, second, our commitment to moral equality is explained by or grounded in 
the rejection of inferiorizing treatment as socially cruel (rather than the other 
way round). (103, emphases in the original) 
 
Equal moral status is therefore an object of human rights, 
something to which we have a right. It is a status that human rights 
aim to secure for us, rather than a status that we already possess. 
I do not quarrel with Sangiovanni’s claim that human rights can 
be equality-bestowing or, more accurately, inequality-preventing, 
but I question whether accepting that view entails rejecting equal 
moral status traditionally conceived. These are two different yet 
compatible sorts of equality, located at different points in human 
rights argument. One concerns the object of some human rights 
(Sangiovanni does not claim that his equality is the only or the 
major object of all human rights); the other concerns the 
possession of human rights as such. One is a distribuend of some 
human rights; the other is a principle governing the distribution of 
human rights.6 It is hard to see why that distribution should be 
equal if we dispense with the equal moral status of human beings 
as bearers of human rights. 
I want to point to a particular feature of human rights usage 
which is hard to justify without the traditional idea of equal moral 
status. Sangiovanni concedes that the capacity to which he appeals 
in condemning the social cruelty of unequal treatment – the 
“capacity to develop and maintain an integrated sense of self” – is 
 
6 Although not only that; status matters as well as equal status. 
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one in respect of which people may be differently vulnerable. He 
argues, reasonably enough, that variable vulnerability is not a 
problem for his position: a common right to equality can justify 
different duties in respect of people who are differently vulnerable 
to inequality and its consequences (104-10). By contrast, such 
variability is a problem, he claims, for dignity-first accounts which 
make dignity dependent on a variable property such as capacity for 
rational action. But why should we make people’s moral status – 
the extent to which they matter – dependent on any such capacity? 
Freed of that misplaced endeavour, the idea of equal moral status 
enables us to make sense of variable human rights. Several rights 
claimed as human rights, including in UN documents, are not 
universal. Some are unique to women, such as the right not to be 
subjected to forced pregnancy or forced abortion; some are 
possessed in childhood but not adulthood, and vice versa; people 
suffering from dementia or other forms of mental incapacity have 
rights to care that others do not, but they may not have rights to 
freedoms they would otherwise possess; indigenous peoples have 
rights that differ from those of other peoples. How, then, can these 
be human rights? The answer is by being rights we hold in virtue 
of our status, and our equal status, as human beings. So 
understood, the rights we have can vary according to differences 
in our condition and circumstances7; but they can remain human 
rights because they are rights we hold in virtue of our equal moral 
status as human beings. 
 
Newcastle University 
 
7 See further P. Jones, Peter. 2018. ‘Collective and Group-Specific: Can the 
Rights of Ethno-Cultural Minorities be Human Rights?’, in G. Pentassuglia (ed.), 
Ethno-Cultural Diversity and Human Rights: Challenges and Critiques (Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2018), 27-58. 
